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INTRODUCTION
In June 2020, India banned TikTok along with fifty-nine other apps developed
by Chinese firms.1 The move, although not unexpected, was just part of a drive by
the Indian government to challenge Chinas growing clout in the digital ecosystem,
and in response to border clashes that left twenty Indian soldiers dead.2 The rise of
so-called techno nationalism is one component of a larger move toward greater
data localization3 and even cyber sovereignty.4 This conceptualization of Internet
* Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Indiana University Kelley School of
Business; Chair, Indiana UniversityBloomington Cybersecurity Risk Management Program;
Executive Director, Ostrom Workshop.
1
See Manish Singh, India Bans TikTok, Dozens of Other Chinese Apps, TECH. CRUNCH
(June 29, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/29/india-bans-tiktok-dozens-of-other-chi
nese-apps/ [https://perma.cc/HN68-G4D7].
2
See India Hits Back at China by Banning TikTok, Other Apps, As Techno-Nationalism
Rises, WBUR (July 3, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2020/07/03/india-china-tik
tok-techno-nationalism [https://perma.cc/4ENH-N3YE].
3
See generally Jennifer Huddleston & Jacqueline Varas, Impact of Data Localization
Requirements on Commerce and Innovation, AM. ACTION F. (June 16, 2020), https://www
.americanactionforum.org/insight/impact-of-data-localization-requirements-on-commerce
-and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/HQ8X-UDED].
4
See, e.g., Adam Segal, Chinas Vision for Cyber Sovereignty and the Global Governance
of Cyberspace, NATL BUR. ASIAN RES. at 85100 (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nbr.org/pub
lication/chinas-vision-for-cyber-sovereignty-and-the-global-governance-of-cyberspace/
[https://perma.cc/Y9L7-4C6T].
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governance represents a significant shift from long-held beliefs on the part of many
Western nations about building a cyberspace that is free, open, interoperable, secure,
and resilient and one that is more closed, highly regulated, and de-anonymized.5
The debate over the future of Internet governance between those preferring more
multilateral versus multi-stakeholder is an oversimplification, but it does highlight
the different visions for cyberspace, including to what extent information sharing
will be possible between digital walled gardens.6 Such sharing is vitalif challengingto permitting like-minded nations and other stakeholders to work together
to defend against common threats and build a global culture of cybersecurity.7 Yet
even among historic allies, such as the transatlantic alliance between the United
States and Europe, walls are going up that are making it more challenging for both
the public and private sectors alike to pool their resources and expertise to better
confront common challenges.
The drifting apart of the United States and Europe when it comes to privacy
protections and data governance best practices predated the turbulence of the Trump
administration. In 2015, for example,8 the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) invalidated the then fifteen-year-old EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement in
Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner,9 causing some consternation on the part
of the more than 5,000 European and U.S. firms that relied on the Agreement to
transfer EU data to U.S. servers.10 With the benefit of hindsight, this decision may be
seen as an important step in a growing rift between the EU and United States not
only on privacy law, but also the future of Internet governance itself. Now, looking
back six years later, while the feared economic harms were largely avoided, the ancestor agreement to Safe Harbor, called Privacy Shield, faced another round of scrutiny
before the CJEU tested many of the same legal issues that arose in the Safe Harbor
5

See Robert Morgus & Justin Sherman, The Five Ideals: The Idealized Internet vs. Internet Realities (V. 1.0), NEW AM. FOUND., https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initia
tive/reports/idealized-internet-vs-internet-realities/the-five-ideals/ [https://perma.cc/SU7U
-NVEX] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
6
See generally, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, 16 GEO. J. INTL AFF. 83 (2015).
7
See Deborah Housen-Couriel, Information Sharing as a Critical Best Practice for the
Sustainability of Cyber Peace, in CYBER PEACE: CHARTING A PATH TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE, STABLE, AND SECURE CYBERSPACE (Scott J. Shackelford, Frederick Douzet, &
Chris Ankersen eds., 2021).
8
Europe Has to Rebuild Its Safe Harbor, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 19, 2015), http://
www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-19/europe-has-to-rebuild-its-safe-harbor [https://
perma.cc/G6DB-N7KK].
9
Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commr, ECLI:EU:C:2015
:650, ¶ 107 (Oct. 6, 2015).
10
Daniel Alvarez, Safe Harbor Is Dead; Long Live the Privacy Shield?, A.B.A. (May 20,
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2016/05/09_alva
rez/ [https://perma.cc/T698-SCR4].
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dispute, but with the addition of Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) that have
been used for decades to help firms transfer data between EU and non-EU nations.11
This Article reviews this history as a case study for larger issues surrounding
information sharing and assesses the Schrems saga, including what options exist for
resolving this transatlantic impasse given the CJEUs July 2020 decision invalidating
Privacy Shield.12 At stake are larger questions about the ability of like-minded nations,
and indeed the international community, to come together to meaningfully address
common cyber-enabled threats. The Article is structured as follows. Part I examines
Schrems I (Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner) and the fall of the Safe Harbor
regime. Part II analyzes Schrems II (Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook &
Max Schrems) along with the rise and fall of Privacy Shield. Part III focuses on opportunities to bridge the data governance divide and present a united front to help
ensure a free, open, interoperable, secure, and resilient vision for cyberspace.
I. SCHREMS I: SCHREMS V. DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER
(FALL OF SAFE HARBOR)
The case that has become colloquially known as Schrems I was brought by an
Austrian law student and civil rights advocate, Maximilian Schrems, who sought to
challenge Facebooks international data transfers from Ireland (where Facebooks
European subsidiary is headquartered) to the United States, arguing that this practice
infringed on his privacy rights due to the potential for U.S. government surveillance. 13
The Irish Data Protection Commissioner rejected Schrems complaint on the grounds
that the European Commission had already decided that the United States ensured
an adequate level of privacy protections.14 Schrems appealed that decision to the
Irish High Court, which referred the dispute to the CJEU.15
At the heart of the case was the Safe Harbor Agreement negotiated between the
EU and United States in response to the 1998 EU Data Protection Directive (DPD),
11

See Jennifer Baker, EU High Court Hearings to Determine Future of Privacy Shield,
SCCs, INTL ASSN PRIV. PROS. (June 25, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/eu-high-court-hearings
-to-determine-future-of-privacy-shield-standard-contractual-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/EZ8J
-7X45]; Standard Contractual Clauses (SCC), EUR. COMMN, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law
/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/standard-contractual
-clauses-scc_en [https://perma.cc/6JUJ-Z44D] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
12
See Alaap B. Shah, CJEU Invalidated the EU-US Privacy Shield Framework, NATL
L. REV. (July 28, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ecj-invalidated-eu-us-privacy
-shield-framework#:~:text=On%20July%207%2C%20the%20Court,C%2D311%2F18) [https://
perma.cc/4EMF-PDMD].
13
See, e.g., Leo Kelion, Facebook Data Transfers Threatened by Safe Harbor Ruling, BBC
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34442618 [https://perma.cc/SN7S-4G6J];
Baker, supra note 11.
14
See Scott Russell, Unsafe Harbor?, CTR.APPLIED CYBERSEC. RSCH.(Oct. 9, 2015), https://
cacrcybersecurity.wordpress.com/2015/10/09/unsafe-harbor/ [https://perma.cc/3LS6-3Y8B].
15
Id.
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which directed EU Member States to enact legislation containing certain privacy
safeguards and prohibited the transferring of data on EU persons to non-EU nations
that do not maintain adequate privacy safeguards.16 The architects of this provision had
the best intentions, namely to ratchet up privacy protections in EU partners, but the
agreement left U.S. firms (many of which then, as now, are global tech leaders) in a
difficult position given that, until the Safe Harbor Agreement was finalized, U.S. privacy law was found to be inadequate.17 Under Safe Harbor, U.S. companies transferring data on EU persons pledged to self-certify that safeguards were in place that
went beyond those required by the more sector-specific U.S. privacy law.18 It was
largely successful at easing transatlantic data flows, at least until the 2013 revelations by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who succeeded in bringing to
light a number of U.S. surveillance programs.19 These resulted in thirteen recommendations by the European Commission for revising Safe Harbor and set the stage
for Schrems I.20
Among other concerns, in its Schrems I decision the CJEU noted that carve outs
in the Safe Harbor Agreementsuch as for U.S. national security, public interest,
and law enforcementopened the door for bulk data collection, including the NSA
program code-named PRISM.21 This reasoning led the CJEU to hold that: (1) the
U.S. bulk collection of personal data violated the privacy rights of EU citizens, stating
that generali[z]ed data storage by a foreign government lacking any objective criteria being specified as to the extent of the datas use is inconsistent with the DPD;22
and (2) that EU citizens were not afforded the opportunity to challenge these U.S.
practices, compromising their right to judicial review.23 Ultimately the CJEU decided
that no amount of self-certification could get around U.S. surveillance practices,
which were found to be irreconcilable with EU privacy law (even though the USA
Freedom Act, passed prior to the Schrems I ruling, outlaws the kind of bulk data
collection that this CJEU decision says violates the DPD).24 It also found that the
16

See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework, FED. TRADE COMMN, https://www.ftc.gov/tips
-advice/business-center/privacy-and-security/u.s.-eu-safe-harbor-framework [https://perma
.cc/8TCJ-U7CR] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
17
See DOUGLAS K. VAN DUYNE ET AL., THE DESIGN OF SITES 328 (2003).
18
See JOHN K. HALVEY & BARBARA MURPHY MELBY, BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING:
PROCESS, STRATEGIES, AND CONTRACTS 472 (2007).
19
See, e.g., Kieren McCarthy, Snowden, Schrems, Safe Harbor . . . Its Time to Rethink
Privacy Policies, Says FTC Commish, THE REG. (Oct. 23, 2015, 8:34 PM), http://www.the
register.co.uk/2015/10/23/ftc_eu_safe_harbor/ [https://perma.cc/Y896-ZJEY].
20
See Russell, supra note 14; see Europe Has to Rebuild Its Safe Harbor, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Oct. 19, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-10-19/europe
-has-to-rebuild-its-safe-harbor [https://perma.cc/2JZS-S5SC].
21
Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (Schrems I),
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 22 (Oct. 6, 2015).
22
Id. ¶ 93.
23
Id. ¶ 23.
24
Id. ¶¶ 86, 101 (For more on reactions to the USA Freedom Act, see Bill Chappell,
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CJEU alone has the power to decide whether or not European Commission decisions
on the privacy practices of other nations are valid.25
This outcome resulted in the fall of the Safe Harbor regime, calling into question
whether U.S. firms could continue transferring data collected on EU citizens back
to U.S.-based data centers. It also teed up larger questions as to the ability of the
United States and Europe to come together on central questions of data governance
including with regards to information sharing, which remained largely unresolved,
setting the stage for Schrems II. These cases also highlight the extent to which national
security considerations are influencing these debates about privacy rights that could
fuel a new wave of data localization, which would not only be costly and challenging, but also risk the $7 trillion transatlantic economic and security relationship.26
II. SCHREMS II: DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER V. FACEBOOK & MAX SCHREMS
(RISE AND FUTURE OF PRIVACY SHIELD)
Following the CJEU ruling invalidating Safe Harbor, Irish judges confirmed that
U.S. authorities did indeed engage in mass processing of Europeans data.27 This
prompted the EU and the United States to come together and create a replacement
regime for Safe Harbor called Privacy Shield.28 The new agreement differed in several
ways from its predecessor in response to the CJEUs Schrems I ruling, including
instituting new requirements for privacy policies to be posted to the U.S. Department of Commerce Program List.29 It also grants [t]he right of data subjects to
access [their] data, [a]cknowledge[s] liability in relation to onward data transfers,
accepts binding arbitration to resolve disputes, and requires covered entities to
[t]ake steps to stop unauthorized processing and to minimize the amount of time
that data is retained.30 After Privacy Shield was created in 2016, by three years later
Senate Approves USA Freedom Act, Obama Signs It, After Amendments Fail, NPR (June 2,
2015, 4:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/02/411534447/senateis
-poised-to-vote-on-house-approved-usa-freedom-act [https://perma.cc/VAP6-DL7S]).
25
See Russell, supra note 14.
26
See Kenneth Propp & Peter Swire, Geopolitical Implications of the European Courts
Schrems II Decision, LAWFARE (July 17, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/geo
political-implications-european-courts-schrems-ii-decision [https://perma.cc/ZDM6-9UNG].
Schrems I, Case C-362/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
27
Baker, supra note 11.
28
Press Release, Eur. Commn, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Third Review Welcomes Progress
While Identifying Steps for Improvement, U.N. Press Release No. IP/16/6134 (Oct. 23, 2019)
[hereinafter Press Release, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield].
29
Privacy Shield Program Overview, PRIV. SHIELD (last visited Dec. 13, 2021), https://
www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview [https://perma.cc/3KS4-6F3R].
30
David A. Zetoony, A Side-By-Side Comparison of Privacy Shield and the Safe
Harbor, BRYAN CAVE (2016), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Comparison-of-Pri
vacy-Shield-and-the-Safe-Harbor.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW2S-NGJR].
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some 5,000 companies participated in Privacy Shield, with the EU Commissioner for
Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, V ra Jourová, calling it a success story.31
Yet the status quo has its detractors, including Schrems, who launched a lawsuit
challenging Facebooks reliance on so-called Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs)
to transfer data from Ireland back to its U.S. headquarters, along with three French
digital rights groups who brought a separate but related action claiming that Privacy
Shield fail[ed] to uphold fundamental EU rights.32 In essence, Schrems and these
other groups argued that these data, both while they are being transferred and when
at rest in U.S. data centers, could be accessed by U.S. intelligence agencies in violation
of the EUs General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).33 This groundbreaking data
governance regime, which came into force in 2018 after the outcome in Schrems I,
is arguably among the toughest privacy and security law[s] in the world.34 It is
notable both for its breadth (under GDPR Article 4 any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person are afforded protections under GDPR including the IP addresses of users),35 and enforcement with fines that could reach up
to four percent of a firms global total revenue.36 Among other practices mandated
under GDPR are provisions related to data transfers, which apply when personal data
is being transferred to a non-EEA (European Economic Area) nation to which GDPR
does not apply.37 One way around this issue is through so-called adequacy decision, in which the EU Commission after thorough evolution of national laws have
concluded that a countrys data protection laws are essentially equally good as the
GDPR.38 As of February 2021, a dozen nations have been designated as adequate
for purposes of EU data governance; negotiations are ongoing with South Korea. 39
31

Press Release, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, supra note 28.
Baker, supra note 11.
33
See, e.g., Schrems II a SummaryAll You Need to Know, GDPR SUMMARY (Nov. 23,
2020), https://www.gdprsummary.com/schrems-ii/ [https://perma.cc/D29E-AEJ6].
34
What Is GDPR, the EUs New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/what
-is-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/9U3T-LQ38] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
35
Luke Irwin, GDPR: How the Definition of Personal Data Has Changed, IT GOVERNANCE BLOG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog/gdpr-how-the-definition
-of-personal-data-will-change [https://perma.cc/6BH7-TWKW] (noting that Article 2 of the
GDPR stating that the Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly
by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data
which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system).
36
What Are the GDPR Fines?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/fines/ [https://perma.cc/65EC
-V9GZ] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
37
Id.
38
Schrems II a SummaryAll You Need to Know, supra note 33 (noting that there are
also options for binding corporate rules for intragroup transfers, and under GDPR Article 49
derogations).
39
These nations include: Andorra, Argentina, Canada (commercial organizations), Faroe
Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland and Uruguay.
32
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It should come as no surprise that the United States is not on the list, calling Facebooks data transfers into question.40
Initial hearings in Irelands Supreme Court in July 2019 were postponed until
the suit brought by Irelands Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) against Schrems
and Facebook before the CJEU was resolved (Schrems II).41 Among other topics, the
CJEU was asked to decide whether Facebook data transfers to the U.S. meet EU privacy standards.42 Facebook argued that they do, given that they comport with Privacy
Shield, but the bigger question remained as to whether U.S. government surveillance
violate the privacy rights of Europeans under GDPR. 43 A decision came down in
July 2020, with the CJEU deciding to invalidate Privacy Shield, particularly citing
the wide surveillance that they saw as being enabled under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) Section 702, Executive Order 12333, and Presidential Decision Directive 28.44 In particular, the Court noted that the United States would
disregard Privacy Shield for national security, public interest, or law enforcement
requirements, thus violating the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.45 Additionally,
because the rights of EU data subjects were not actionable in U.S. courts, aggrieved
EU citizens did not have a means to challenge this data collection even under the
Ombudsman envisioned under Privacy Shield; the Court deemed the regime to be
ineffective given that it is not a tribunal, is managed solely by the executive branch,
and as such cannot hold the intelligence community accountable.46
The CJEU answered a series of key questions related to transatlantic data
governance in Schrems II. This includes the CJEU ruling that Facebook Ireland
sending data on Europe-based users back to Facebook servers in the United States
does fall under Article 45(2)(a) of GDPR.47 It further underscored the level of
See Adequacy Decisions, EU COMMN, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protec
tion/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en [https://perma.cc/JN53
-BMUZ] (last visited Dec. 13, 2021).
40
See id. (noting that the United States is not on the list of states that the EU has designated as adequate).
41
Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Commr v. Facebook Ir. (Schrems II), ECLI:EU:C:2020:559,
¶ 167 (July 16, 2020); Derek Scally, Irish Watchdogs Case Against Facebook to Be Heard
in Europes Highest Court, IRISH TIMES (July 9, 2019, 5:13 AM), https://www.irishtimes.com
/business/technology/irish-watchdog-s-case-against-facebook-to-be-heard-in-europe-s-highest
-court-1.3950568 [https://perma.cc/56B3-SFK6].
42
Scally, supra note 41.
43
See Ashley Gorski, EU Court of Justice Grapples with U.S. Surveillance in Schrems II,
JUST SEC. (July 26, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/65069/eu-court-of-justice-grapples
-with-u-s-surveillance-in-schrems-ii/ [https://perma.cc/T4B4-L4BF].
44
Schrems II a SummaryAll You Need to Know, supra note 33.
45
Data Prot. Commr, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶ 167.
46
Id. ¶¶ 181, 191.
47
Id. ¶¶ 8788 (Indeed, by expressly requiring the Commission, when assessing the adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country, to take account, inter alia, of
relevant legislation, both general and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence,
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protection required by GDPR for these data flows, namely that data subjects must be
afforded appropriate safeguards, enforceable rights and effective legal remedies[,]48
and that such protection must be essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the
European Union.49 Moreover, the CJEU took the additional step of calling the use
of SCCs to transfer personal data into question.50 In effect, it now places the onus
on companies to verify the privacy regimes in place across the nations in which they
do business, including the United States.51 As such, even though the CJEU ruled that
SCCs are still presumptively valid even if they do not apply to supervisory authorities such as the NSA, they still need to incorporate effective mechanisms.52
In essence, then, the CJEU repeated the essential equivalence standard from
Schrems I in Schrems II, including with respect to how [a] government might access
the data.53 The failure of Privacy Shield to guarantee actionable rights of redress
before an independent and impartial court sealed the fate of the regime, according
to the CJEU,54 given that the right to effective judicial protection is guaranteed in
Article 47 of the EU Charter.55 Ironically, of course, EU governments need not meet
this same high standard, given that the Unions governing treaties state that national security remains the sole responsibility of each member state.56 As such, it
is left to each EU Member State how to balance necessary and proportionate
limitations on the privacy rights of their citizens for national security purposes, even
though such flexibility has not been accorded to non-EU nations by the CJEU by the
Schrems cases.
national security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to personal data, as well
as the implementation of such legislation.).
48
Id. ¶ 103.
49
Id. ¶ 105.
50
Id. (noting that consideration must be given to contractual clauses of the controller or
processor in the EU and the recipient in the third country, as well as the relevant aspects of
the legal system of countries that allow access for public authorities).
51
Id.
52
Id. ¶¶ 136, 146 (noting at paragraph 136 that the mere fact that standard data protection
clauses in a Commission decision adopted pursuant to Article 46(2)(c) of the GDPR, such
as those in the annex to the SCC Decision, do not bind the authorities of third countries to
which personal data may be transferred cannot affect the validity of that decision).
53
See Kenneth Propp & Peter Swire, After Schrems II: A Proposal to Meet the Individual
Redress Challenge, LAWFARE (Aug. 13, 2020, 7:28 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/after
-schrems-ii-proposal-meet-individual-redress-challenge [https://perma.cc/NN2P-CFM8].
54
Id.
55
Id. (noting that the CJEU also determined that there is a lack of proportionality in
the scale of U.S. intelligence activities. The Court did not dwell much on the issue of proportionality, other than expressing its disapproval of the scope of bulk personal data collection
programs conducted under the authority of FISA Section 702 and EO 12333.).
56
Id. (noting that many EU nations lack the same safeguards found to be deficient in the
United States under Schrems I and Schrems II, and that this interpretation of EU nations having
greater leeway under this regime is also up for review before the CJEU).
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The implications of Schrems II, and the finding by the Court of a fundamental
right for a citizen of one nation to receive redress concerning surveillance by another
nation, are potentially far-reaching indeed.57 Predictably, the decision was derided
in the U.S. national security community, with former NSA General Counsel Stewart
Baker describing it as a mix of judicial imperialism and Eurocentric hypocrisy.58
Such a confrontational tone was balanced with a more conciliatory reaction from
industry groups that pushed for a new round of negotiations to avoid undue economic damage to the transatlantic trade in data, which is valued in excess of $1.3
trillion annually.59 The broader national security implications, along with the impact
of Schrems II on emerging strategic technologies such as AI, are likewise manifold.60
Not only are big tech platforms being impacted by the manifest fragility of the
existing regime in which any European Commission finding of adequacy is potentially suspect, but so are an increasing number of data-driven industries ranging
from manufacturing to finance and health care.61 Schrems II also highlights the
extent to which GDPRs broad mandate, as interpreted by the CJEU, to extend EU
privacy rights and obligations to all nations receiving data on EU persons is
shaping not only transatlantic, but global data flows and governance structures.62
This nakedly extraterritorial assertion of EU jurisdiction, to use Swires evocative
phrasing, ignored both relevant jurisprudence from the European Court of Human
Rights and EU Member State constitutional decisions.63 In essence, then, the CJEU
made GDPR the yardstick by which to measure what is necessary in a democratic
society to safeguard national security, with little in the way of nuance or flexibility
owing to unique national circumstances or legal traditions.64
SCCs as well do not bind government agencies, so their use in this context does
not necessarily remedy the core issue in play.65 This will hit small firms particularly
hard given the costs associated with this revised regime, such as putting the onus on
SMEs in third-party nations like the United States to notify the EU of changes in
57

Id. (noting that Schrems II mirrors a decision by the German Federal Constitutional
Court about the rights of foreign persons in devising proportionate surveillance regime[s],
but that even the German court did not go so far as to accord a right of judicial redress).
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See Joshua P. Meltzer, The Court of Justice of the European Union in Schrems II: The
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legislation that would prevent them from complying with their SCC obligations. 66
This degree of monitoring and data governance due diligence is simply beyond the
means, and ability, of many small firms.67
Further, the CJEUs holding on SCCs are also potentially far more destabilizing
than the demise of Safe Harbor. Among other things, the Schrems saga could further
fuel the wave of data localization we are already witnessing around the world.68 It
could, in a worst-case scenario, also lead to a self-imposed data isolation as more
nations, including but not limited to the United States, focus more on cybersecurity
in their data governance regimes bringing them further out of alignment with GDPR.69
In sum, the end result of the Schrems saga, as Joshua Meltzer from the Brookings
Institution has argued, is that all GDPR mechanisms for transferring personal data
to third countries are much more limited in scope, durability and stability.70 Indeed,
aside from the United States, there is an argument to be made that the greatest geopolitical impacts of Schrems II may well be on authoritarian regimes such as China
and Russia.71 Nations practicing a robust interpretation of cyber sovereignty, for
example, will be hard pressed to show that the protections that they offer are essentially equivalent to those in the EU, or to ensure that the GDPR is fully enforced
with all due diligence.72 The EU Data Protection Supervisor Wojciech Wiewiórowski,
for example, is on the record as stating that the United States is much closer to the
EU with regards to data governance than the likes of China. 73 Even nations with
well-developed commitments to the rule of law, such as the United Kingdom postBrexit, may also run afoul of this ruling given the extensive surveillance for national
security purposes that is undertaken by the likes of the GCHQ.74 As such, the impacts of Schrems are likely not just transatlantic but global, potentially exacerbating
digital divides over data governance.
III. BRIDGING THE DIVIDE ON PRIVACY RIGHTS AND INTERNET GOVERNANCE
Looking ahead, there are four main options to resolve these concerns, each
involving uncomfortable consequences for Europeans, Americans, and citizens around
the world. First, the European Commission could negotiate a new bilateral agreement with the United States, a Privacy Shield 2.0 that would address ongoing concerns and avoid disruptions to global supply chains generally, and social networking,
e-commerce, and cloud service firms in particular. This option holds the potential
66
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to more directly address European concerns by gaining further concessions on the part
of the U.S. government on bulk data collection and EU standing to access, correct, and
delete personal data. But it also calls into question the status of other EU data privacy
agreements, potentially leading to further renegotiations and business disruptions. 75
It is not atypical for U.S. and EU negotiators to take several attempts to reach
a durable agreement on issues of data governance, as seen in previous sagas involving the exchange of airline passenger data and terrorist financing.76 There is also
precedent for the U.S. government taking a more flexible approach to European
privacy demands, as seen in a 2016 umbrella agreement that required the United
States to amend the Privacy Act to grant foreign persons a right to sue equivalent
to that enjoyed by U.S. persons. This step, as Peter Swire and Kenneth Propp note,
has not resulted in burdensome litigation by Europeans in U.S. courts.77
A durable replacement to Privacy Shield will require both: (1) a credible factfinding inquiry into classified surveillance activities in order to ensure protection of
the individuals rights, and (2) the possibility of appeal to an independent judicial
body that can remedy any violation of rights should it occur.78 The former may be
accomplished by enlisting already existing privacy and civil liberties officers (PCLOs)
spread across the intelligence community, given that they already have access to the
required databases and enjoy established reporting channels along with adequate staff
support.79 Yet the European Commission and the CJEU would likely push back against
this notion, given that these officers remain ultimately beholden to the executive branch,
and thus cannot act as an effective independent check against U.S. intelligence bulk
data collection.80 The second needed reform may be accomplished through an appeal
mechanism after the fact-finding phase of an investigation is completed to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, given that these judges fall under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution and are also guaranteed life tenure.81 Additional reforms,
including those relating to standing, are also important given the higher burden placed
75
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U.S. Treasury Department required two tries before concluding a 2010 agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program that provides U.S. authorities with a steady flow of international
bank transfer data from EU territory).
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on plaintiffs challenging intelligence practices in the United States as compared to
Europe.82 Swire and Propp suggest a modified version of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to help bridge this gap given that this regime permits individuals
to request documents without first demonstrating an injury.83 Their suggestion leverages
U.S. laws that permit individuals to test compliance with acts that an agency is
required to perform, by requiring that agencies tasked with assessing surveillance
activities be required to also undertake fact-finding investigations that could be
appealable to an independent federal courtand ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.84
This set of proposals could help raise the shields once again thereby permitting the relatively free flow of data across the Atlantic, leading to a durable Privacy Shield 2.0.
Second, the SCCs regime could be updated (they still refer to the EUs Data
Protection Directive and not GDPR, for example), which would be a useful next step
given that, according to Hogan Lovells Eduardo Ustartan: The Privacy Shield has
always been surrounded by a degree of uncertainty, but the SCCs have been around
for nearly 20 years, so they are the bedrock of lawful data transfers.85 The United
States would be joined in this effort by the U.K., given that these legal tools are regarded as the most obvious fix to the loss of data protection adequacy by the U.K.
post-Brexit.86 In November 2020, the European Commission released its draft Decision on Standard Contractual Clauses.87 A final draft was not available at the time
of publication, but the U.S. government did submit comments to the Commission
prior to the release of the draft, which came just two months after the Swiss-U.S.
Privacy Shield Framework was invalidated by the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner of Switzerland.88
Third, firms could rely on intragroup data transfers within multinationals, but
such binding corporate rules (BCRs) and governance structures are time intensive
and complex to create, and at any rate would be of little use to small and mediumsized businesses currently relying on Privacy Shield.89 Further, they run into the same
issues as SCCs discussed above, even asover the long termthey may be more
cost effective.90
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Fourth, there is the much more substantial task of modernizing international
privacy law to take into account data governance trends, and to create verification
and enforcement mechanisms. For example, even though existing international human
rights law references the right to privacy, such as in Articles 3 and 19 of the UN
Declaration of Human Rights,91 and Articles 17 and 19 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),92 neither treaty framework has been updated
with cyberspace in mind.93 Yet there has been some progress, such as a 2013 UN
General Assembly Resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age,94 and a 2015
statement by the G20 that endorsed the concept of privacy, including in the context
of digital communications.95 Given the focus by the Biden administration on finding
multilateral solutions to pressing global challenges, there may well be an opportunity to build from this momentum, much of which stalled during the Trump administration.96 Go[ing] big, in this way, on global data governance by balancing national
security concerns with privacy protections is certainly a heavy lift, but at the same
time such a robust, durable international regime would avoid the bilateral band-aids
like Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield that have bedeviled practitioners and policymakers alike.97 Such an agreement would be unlikely to be agreeable to democratic and
authoritarian societies alike, but even getting democracies on closer to the same
page would be a huge step forward and a useful foundation from which to tackle
related issues of cybersecurity, AI governance, and misinformation. Options for
forums to utilize include the World Trade Organization along with the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development, which successfully developed data
governance principles in 1980.98
If none of these options are adopted, then costs will mount, both financial and,
perhaps surprisingly, personal.99 Beyond governmental spyingan issue extending
91
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beyond the United States to include a number of EU Member States including France,
Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands100there is also the risk that the lack
of a new formal agreement could embolden data black markets as well as exacerbate
both cyber risk and transatlantic tensions.101 Such an outcome could also hobble law
enforcement efforts due to nations citing privacy concerns as reasons not to fulfill
their obligations under Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, making it more difficult
to find, extradite, and prosecute cybercriminals.102 The end result would be less
transatlantic cybersecurity cooperation, further widening the divide on both security
and privacy at a time of already heightened tensions.
The Schrems saga demonstrates the extent to which transatlantic privacy rights
are diverging,103 at a time of relative global convergence with more than 100 nations
now having omnibus privacy laws reminiscentif not as robustof GDPR already
enacted.104 As Professor James Whitman has argued, and as Schrems demonstrates,
[i]n the law of privacy . . . the contrast between Europe and the United States is stark
and is growing starker.105 Aside from data protection, this trend may be seen in differing conceptions over what counts as news and the public interest, as well as
who public figures are and what privacy rights they should enjoy.106 Part of the reason
for this divide is that, despite the United States and Europes shared fascination
with celebrity, differences in legal cultures permeate transatlantic privacy law. For
example, some have criticized European jurists as elitist given their stance on the
Programs, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/nsa
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publics right to know.107 This may be seen in cases like Von Hannover v. Germany,
in which Princess Caroline of Monaco recovered for breach of privacy against
German publishers, which would likely have had a very different outcome in a U.S.
court given First Amendment preferences for freedom of expression over individual
privacy rights.108
As with privacy, the Schrems saga also highlights contrasting EU and U.S. views
on Internet governance generally, particularly with regard to cyber sovereignty.109 The
EU, for example, has sought to keep data on EU citizens within its territorial borders.
Similarly, GDPR goes even further, asserting the EUs ability to regulate all data
related to EU persons, regardless of its storage location or place of origination.110 Following from other EU precedent, such as the right to be forgotten and the EU antitrust
cases,111 the EU is, in some ways, pushing a view of privacy that is quickly becoming
the default global standard. Various nations, including some with already relatively
strong privacy regimes such as Canada, Australia, and Japan, are in the process of
updating their laws to comply with GDPR and ease data transfers, as was discussed
in Part II.112 More multinational firms, including U.S. behemoths like the pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly, are complying with GDPR for their global operations.113
At a higher level, as was referenced in Part II, there are positive network effects
to encouraging robust information sharing. Indeed, it has been described as a core
confidence building measure (CBM), according to Professor Deborah HousenCouriel, by the OSCE,114 the UNs 2015 GGE,115 the 2018 Paris Call for Trust and
107
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Security in Cyberspace116 and other organizations.117 Robust information sharing
is a vital component in the building of institutions to manage various knowledge
commons, and more generally to aid coordination, and promote trust,118 which as
noted by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, is the most important resource. 119 One
mechanism to conceptualize this type of approach to networked, distributed data
governance is polycentric governance.120 As noted by Professor Dan Cole:
Decades of work conducted by researchers associated with the
Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis at Indiana University have emphasized two chief
advantages of polycentric approaches over monocentric ones:
they provide more opportunities for experimentation and learning to improve policies over time, and they increase communications and interactionsformal and informal, bilateral and
multilateralamong parties to help build the mutual trust needed
for increased cooperation.121
Polycentricity is no panacea given the extent to which it can lead to gridlock and
other systemic failures,122 but it can be a pragmatic path forward that the Biden
administration in particular could pursue given the rich array of cyber norm building
efforts underway through the UN, EU, and otherwise.123
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The ability of cyber powers to reshape the global regulatory environment is an
important, if often underappreciated, element of Internet governance.124 Is cyberspace,
then, a global networked commons,125 as maintained by former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, an extension of national territory, as France and the CJEU seems
to maintain, or something in between: an imperfect or pseudo commons as argued
by Professor Joseph Nye, Jr.?126 Fissures seem to be deepening with concerns over
the Splinternet, or what had previously been called Internet Balkanization or a
New Digital Divide again reaching a fever pitch in the wake of the race to dominate 5G globally.127 Indeed, there is some evidence that the Trump administration
favored the historically European perspective on Internet governance as seen by the
fact that neither the 2018 U.S. National Cyber Strategies does not, nor did the 2017
Trump Administration cybersecurity executive order, refer to cyberspace as a global
commons.128 Whether a system of Internet governance practicing John Herzs notion
of neoterritorality, whereby sovereign states recognize their common interests
such as the public goods of privacy and cybersecuritywhile also mutually respecting one anothers independence in the face of more decisions like Schrems remains
to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Even if successful, negotiating Privacy Shield 2.0 may well just be another
temporary band-aid for a widening transatlantic data governance wound. What is
needed is a rekindled multi-stakeholder dialogue to help clarify global privacy
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standards and flesh out the right to privacy mentioned in both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ICCPR. Elements of the private sector, including Apple,
Microsoft, and Google, have been calling for global privacy norms for years.129 There
is evidence that policymakers are also coming to this conclusion with growing support for an additional protocol to ICCPR,130 and even the United States is moving
away from a sector-specific approach to privacy protection and toward a GDPR-type
privacy regime. Such efforts could help narrow the widening transatlantic rift and
build a common vision of privacy rights in the digital age across democracies,
perhaps eliminating the need for Schrems III in the process.
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